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TEACHING A MAN TO FISH: WHY NATIONAL
LEGISLATION ANCHORED IN NOTICE AND
CONSENT PROVISIONS IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE
SOLUTION TO THE SPYWARE PROBLEM
M. Angela Buenaventura*
I. INTRODUCTION
[1] The term “spyware” encompasses a wide range of software designed to
intercept or take partial control of a computer. Spyware slows down
computers and forces computer users to expend resources on repair and
installation of protective software.1 Consumers also face the danger that
personal information gathered through spyware will be misused. Thus,
most people agree that spyware is an annoying and costly problem.2
However, there is no consensus on the best way to solve the spyware
problem. This article examines the methods currently being used to battle
spyware, as well as proposed national spyware legislation. The article
outlines the various weaknesses in these methods of combating the
problem, and suggests how these weaknesses can be remedied.
[2] Part II of this paper will argue that state spyware legislation is
inadequate to solve the spyware problem because of Dormant Commerce
Clause issues and regulations that vary from state to state which lead to
significant business planning and litigation costs. Part III will explore
other methods used by plaintiffs to battle spyware: the Wiretap Act, the
* Associate Bryan Cave LLP; JD., Northwestern University School of Law, 2006. The
author would like to express her gratitude to Steven Wernikoff, Andrea Matwyshyn, and
Peter Neumer for their valuable insights and guidance.
1

Federal Trade Commission Notices, Public Workshop: Monitoring Software On Your
PC: Spyware, Adware, and Other Software, 69 Fed. Reg. 8538 (Feb. 24, 2004).
2
Jane K. Winn, Contracting Spyware by Contract, 20 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1348
(2005).
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Stored Communications Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and the
common law claim of trespass to chattels. It will argue that, because
courts so liberally construe “consent” in the e-commerce realm, the
Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act are weak weapons
against spyware. In addition, this manuscript argues that the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act and the common law claim of trespass to chattels
cannot adequately address the problem because these laws are merely
after-the-fact solutions which do not prevent damage to computers in the
first place. Part IV argues that national spyware legislation with detailed
notice and consent requirements is necessary to address the spyware
problem. Part V explores currently pending spyware legislation: the SPY
ACT,3 I-SPY,4 and SPY BLOCK.5 This section will focus on the notice
and consent provisions included in the legislation. The final part will
address the weaknesses in the notice and consent provisions of the
proposed acts and suggest how these acts can be tweaked to remedy their
shortcomings.
II. WHY NATIONAL LEGISLATION IS NECESSARY
A. STATE BILLS
[3] Currently, the only legislation that specifically addresses spyware
exists at the state level. As of May 8, 2005 at least twenty-seven states
were considering or had passed spyware legislation.6 These state bills can
be grouped into three loose categories: “bad acts bills,” “notice bills,” and
“trademark bills.”7

3

Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act, H.R. 29, 109th Cong. (2005)
[hereinafter SPY ACT].
4
Internet Spyware Prevention Act of 2005, H.R. 744, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter ISPY].
5
Software Principles Yielding Better Levels of Consumer Knowledge Act, S. 2145,
109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter SPY BLOCK].
6
Susan P. Crawford, First Do No Harm: The Problem of Spyware, 20 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1433, 1436 (Summer 2005).
7
Id. at 1437.
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1. BAD ACTS BILLS
[4] Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan,
Nebraska, New York, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Washington have
passed or are considering “bad acts bills.”8 Bad acts bills prohibit a
laundry list of software that performs certain unsavory functions such as
changing homepages, bookmarks, or modem, or other Internet access
settings.9 Such bills also prohibit software that transmits unauthorized email messages, using the computer as part of a distributed denial of
service attack, or "opening multiple, sequential, stand alone
advertisements"10 in a browser that cannot be closed without closing the
browser or turning off the computer.11 In addition, software which
collects personally identifiable information through deceptive means is
illegal.12
[5] Moreover, bad acts bills protect anti-spyware software such as Spybot
by prohibiting deceptive prevention of a user's efforts to block software
installations, misrepresentations that software will be uninstalled or
disabled by what the user does next, and deceptive actions to disable antispyware software.13
2. NOTICE BILLS
[6] Michigan, Pennsylvania, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas have passed or
are considering “notice bills.”14 Notice bills prohibit “spyware,” defined
8

Id. at 1441 n. 26 (citing S.B. 122, 2005 Leg. (Ala. 2005); S.B. 2904, 2005 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Ark. 2005); H.B. 2414, 47th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2005); Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code § 22947 (West Supp. 2006); H.B. 380, 94th Gen. Ass. (Ill. 2005); H.B. 945, 2005
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2005); S.B. 151, 2005 Leg. (Mich. 2005); L.B. 316, 99th Leg., 1st
Sess. (Neb. 2005); A.B. 549, 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005); H. 6211, Gen. Ass., Jan.
Sess. (R.I. 2005); H.B. 2215, 2005 Leg., Gen. Ass. (Va. 2005); H.B. 1012, 59th Leg.,
2005 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005)). See generally National Conference of State Legislatures,
2005 State Legislation Relating to Internet Spyware or Adware,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/spyware05.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2005).
9
Id. at 1441.
10
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22947 (West Supp. 2006).
11
Crawford, supra note 6, at 1441.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 1442-1443.
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broadly within the bills,15 unless a consumer is given the name and contact
information of the person installing the software, notice of intent to install
the software, a full license agreement, and a means by which to refuse the
installation and avoid further contact.16
3. TRADEMARK BILLS
[7] Alaska, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Tennessee, and Utah
have passed or are considering “trademark bills,” which address software
that triggers unauthorized advertisements.17 For example, 1-800 Contacts,
a Utah-based company, urged the state legislature to pass a spyware bill
after it discovered that a company called SaveNow was installing software
on consumers’ computers which caused a directory of search terms and
URLs to be saved on the users’ desktop, then generated pop-up ads and
coupons based on the saved data.18 1-800 Contacts was angry that a
competitor’s ads were being triggered by the software to appear in
windows over the 1-800 Contacts site.19 In order to be legal under
trademark bills, software triggering ads must clearly identify the entity
responsible for the ad and cannot be prompted by an unauthorized
trademark use.20 The consent requirement of these bills also calls for a
“full, detailed, plain language license agreement.”21

15

Id. For example, Pennsylvania spyware legislation, H.B. 574, § 2 (Penn. 2005)
(introduced Feb. 16, 2005), defines spyware as follows:
An executable computer program that automatically and without the control of a
computer user gathers and transmits to the provider of the program or to a third
party either of the following types of information:
(1) Personal information or data of a user.
(2) Data regarding computer usage, including, but not limited to, which Internet
sites are, or have been, visited . . . .
16
Crawford, supra note 6, at 1443.
17
Id. at 1441-42,1442 n.28 (citing S.B. 140, 24th Leg. (Alaska 2005); H.B. 1714, 2005
Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2005); S.B. 273, 184th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2005); H.B. 47 (N.H. 2005); H.B.
1742, 104th Gen. Ass. (Tenn. 2005)).
18
Id. at 1438, citing 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 467
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
19
1-800 Contacts, Inc., 309 F. Supp. at 472.
20
Crawford, supra note 6, at 1442 n. 28.
21
Id at 1442.
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B. PROBLEMS WITH STATE BILLS
[8] Because regulating the Internet at the state level conflicts with the
cross-boundary nature of the Internet, national legislation is necessary.
The main problem with state bills is that although these bills target
spyware loaded onto computers in the home state, the transmissions
involved in installation comes from out of the state, and, in order to avoid
liability, out-of-state businesses must conform to standards set by the most
restrictive states.22 Thus, these bills have the unfortunate consequence of
allowing one state to dictate spyware policy for the whole country.
[9] Along with being a policy concern, the fact that a single state can
regulate spyware nationwide also triggers Dormant Commerce Clause
issues, meaning that these bills will most likely be found
unconstitutional.23 In addition, regulations that vary from state to state
lead to significant business planning costs as well as needless litigation of
uncertain causes of action.24 Therefore, spyware must be combated at the
national level.
III. WHY OTHER LAWS ARE INSUFFICIENT TO COPE WITH THE SPYWARE
PROBLEM
[10] State spyware legislation is not the only tool currently being used to
combat spyware: spyware can also be challenged under the Wiretap Act,
the Stored Communications Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and
the common law claim of trespass to chattels.
A. THE WIRETAP ACT AND THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT
[11] Section 2511(1)(a) of the Wiretap Act prohibits any person from
"intentionally intercepting . . . any wire, oral, or electronic
communication."25 The term "intercept" is defined as "the aural or other
22

Peter S. Menell, Regulating “Spyware”: The Limitations of State "Laboratories" and
the Case for Federal Preemption of State Unfair Competition Laws, 20 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1363, 1375-76 (Summer 2005).
23
Crawford, supra note 6, at 1443-44.
24
Menell, supra note 22, at 1412.
25
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2000).
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acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication
through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device."26 One can
argue that URLs convey the meaning of a communication. By virtue of
the way certain web forms operate, some search terms and other
information that a user wishes to remain private can be incorporated into a
URL.27 For example, a search of an online drug store for “Prozac” could
generate a page of search results identified by a URL that contains the
search term “Prozac.” Hence, claims could be brought under the Wiretap
Act when a keystroke monitor or software for contextual advertising
acquires URLs and search terms.
[12] Another electronic surveillance law that has been used to combat
spyware is the Stored Communications Act (SCA).28 The SCA prohibits
gaining unauthorized access to a "facility through which an electronic
communication service is provided," and thereby "obtains, alters, or
prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it
is in electronic storage in such system . . . ."29 The SCA has been used by
plaintiffs to challenge a third party’s use of cookies.30 In In re
DoubleClick, although the court ultimately disposed of the claim on
another issue, the plaintiffs challenged the third-party advertiser’s use of
cookies under the premise that the “facilities” which the third party
accessed were the plaintiffs’ computers.31
[13] However, because the Wiretap Act and the SCA contain consent
exceptions, which can be very liberally construed by courts, these acts
cannot be relied upon to prevent spyware installation. Section 2511(2)(d)
of the Wiretap Act provides:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not
acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or
electronic communication where such person is a party to
the communication or where one of the parties to the
26

Id. at § 2510(4).
Patricia L. Bellia, Spyware and the Limits of Surveillance Law, 20 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1283, 1311 (Summer 2005).
28
18 U.S.C. §2701(a) (2000).
29
Id. at §2701(a)(2).
30
In re Doubleclick, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
31
Id. at 509.
27
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communication has given prior consent to such interception
unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose
of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any
State.32
Similarly, under the SCA, a defendant's access to a protected facility is not
prohibited unless "access without authorization" or exceeding authorized
access is shown.33 The SCA contains an exception for conduct undertaken
with the consent of a "user [of an electronic communication service] with
respect to a communication of or intended for that user."34
1. CONSENT AND “I AGREE” BUTTONS
[14] Spyware bundled with a program that a computer user willingly
downloads almost always obtains "consent" via an “I agree” button
somewhere during the installation procedure, and usually in some hidden
manner. For example, Kazaa, a free peer-to-peer file-sharing application
commonly used to exchange MP3 music files, is bundled with adware that
generates revenue for the company.35 An unsuspecting user who has not
carefully read the terms of Kazaa’s licensing agreement or who does not
understand the terms of the agreement can unwittingly agree to
interceptions under the Wiretap Act by clicking an “I Agree” button.
Thus, the first major issue that arises when addressing the consent
exceptions in the Wiretap Act and the SCA in the spyware context is
whether clicking an “I Agree” button, displayed in connection with a
license agreement detailing the capabilities of software, would constitute
consent to the installation of spyware under the acts.
[15] In the e-commerce realm, courts are willing to construe the clicking
of an “I Agree” button as consent whether or not meaningful consent was
actually present, and whether or not the user even saw the terms to begin
with. In I.Lan Systems, Inc. v. NetScout Service Level Corp., the court
32

18 U.S.C. §2511(2)(d) (2000).
18 U.S.C. §2701(a) (2000).
34
18 U.S.C. §2701(c) (2000).
35
John Borland, Spike in "Spyware" Accelerates Arms Race, CNET NEWS.COM, Feb. 24,
2003, http://news.com.com/2009-1023-985524.html?tag=cd_mh (describing the
expansion of spyware and efforts to combat it).
33
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enforced a license where the terms of the license appeared on screen prior
to software installation and the defendant checked an "I Agree" box.36
Similarly, in Forrest v. Verizon Commications, Inc., the court enforced a
forum selection clause where terms were displayed in a scroll box and the
plaintiff subscriber clicked the "Accept" button.37 In Caspi v. Microsoft
Network, L.L.C., the court enforced a forum selection clause contained in
an agreement with an ISP, even though the prospective subscriber could
only access the service by clicking "I Agree."38
[16] Thus, because courts have been willing to interpret the mere click of
an “I accept” button as consent, even if meaningful consent was in fact
absent, it is likely that courts would consider users who click an “I agree”
button to have consented to the hidden terms included in bundled software
license agreements. Therefore, the SCA and the Wiretap Act cannot
effectively battle the spyware problem.
2. THIRD PARTY CONSENT
[17] The second major issue that arises when addressing the consent
exceptions in the Wiretap Act and the SCA is whether defendants can
argue that a third-party advertiser consented to the interception at issue.
For example, In re Pharmatrak Inc. Privacy Litigation involved a service
provided to pharmaceutical companies by Pharmatrak. 39 Pharmatrak
collected website traffic and aggregate usage information for these
pharmaceutical companies’ websites, but promised the companies that it
would not expose them to liability by collecting personal data from
customers.40 However, Pharmatrak inadvertently collected personal
information from customers, apparently as a result of two of the
subscribing companies changing the method they used to retrieve the
information from Pharmatrak.41 When a group of plaintiffs alleged that
Pharmatrak had violated the Wiretap Act, Pharmatrak asserted that,
because the customers provided their information to Pharmatrak’s client
pharmacies, the pharmacies were parties to the communications and
36

I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. NetScout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002).
Forrest v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007 (D.C. 2002).
38
Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
39
In re Pharmatrak Inc., 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003).
40
Id. at 17.
41
Id. at 15-16.
37
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consented to the use of Pharmatrak's system.42 However, the First Circuit
rejected the consent argument because, although the pharmaceutical
companies had in general terms consented to the use of Pharmatrak's
proposed system for gathering data on customers, the companies never
agreed to the gathering of personally identifiable information.43
Nevertheless, under a different set of factual circumstances – perhaps a
case in which a website’s privacy statement contained buried text
explaining that personally identifiable information would be collected – a
defendant could easily argue that the third-party advertiser consented to
the interception.
[18] In summary, because courts appear willing to apply the consent
exceptions to careless clicks of “I agree” buttons and third-party consent,
surveillance laws are weak weapons against spyware.44
B. THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT AND TRESPASS TO CHATTELS
[19] The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and the common law
claim of trespass to chattels are two other methods of potentially
42

Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
44
Along with notice and consent issues, there are some other problems with using the
Wiretap Act and the SCA to combat spyware. The Wiretap Act requires that a
communication be “intercepted.” Some types of spyware, such as keystroke monitors,
capture data only within a single computer system, e.g. between the keyboard and the
CPU. Two courts considering the issue of whether acquiring data within a single system
can constitute an interception of an electronic communication, and more specifically
addressing the issue of keystroke monitors under the Wiretap Act, have held that if a
device or program captures a communication at a point where the communication is still
internal to the user’s system, then no interception occurs. United States v. Scarfo, 180 F.
Supp. 2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001); United States v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831 (C.D. Cal.
2004). See also Bellia , supra note 27, at 1311. In addition, data collected by spyware
may not be considered the “contents” of a communication. Under the Wiretap Act,
“contents” include the “substance, purport, or meaning” of a communication.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(8) (2000). Thus, a defendant could argue that when keystroke monitors or adware
collects URLs and search terms, the communications do not constitute “contents” of a
communication. With respect to the SCA, as one commentator has noted, even if a court
were to accept the proposition that a user’s hard drive can be considered a facility, the
hard drive does not provide and “electronic communications service.” Even if a court
treats “internet access” as the relevant electronic communications service, then the user’s
hard drive is not a “facility” through which internet access is provided. Id. at 1334.
43
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combating spyware. The CFAA was originally enacted to prosecute
computer crimes of federal interest,45 but was amended in 1994 to provide
for a private right of action.46 A private right of action is available (1)
where there is loss to one or more persons aggregating $ 5,000 in any one
year period; (2) where there has been - or there is a potential for - an
impairment or modification of any medical treatment, diagnosis,
examination, or care; (3) where there has been physical injury; (4) where
there is a threat to public health or safety; or (5) where there is damage
affecting a computer system used by or for a government entity in
furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national
security.47
[20] Consumers can also combat spyware under the common law claim of
trespass to chattels. According to the Restatement of Torts, "[a] trespass
to a chattel may be committed by intentionally . . . using or intermeddling
with a chattel in the possession of another,"48 where "the chattel is
impaired as to its condition, quality, or value . . . ."49 One of the most
commonly cited cases involving trespass to chattels in cyberspace is eBay,
Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc.50 In this case, eBay sued a competitor who
inundated its site with "robots," or computer programs designed to
constantly query the eBay site for auction information. Bidder’s Edge
used robots to collect information from eBay and other auction sites, and
then consolidated the information on its own site.51 The court granted a
preliminary injunction on the trespass claim because it found that the
denial of an injunction would encourage other companies to mimic
Bidder's Edge, thereby overloading eBay's systems.52
1. AFTER-THE-FACT SOLUTIONS
[21] Unfortunately, the CFAA and the common law claim of trespass to
chattels also prove to be incomplete solutions to the spyware problem.
45

S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 4 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2482.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2000).
47
Id. at §1030(a)(5)(B)(i)-(v).
48
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217(b) (1965).
49
Id. § 218(b).
50
eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
51
Id. at 1060-63.
52
Id. at 1072.
46
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The main problem with these solutions is that they are merely after-thefact solutions. They do not require software purveyors to provide any
specific kind of notice to begin with, or require companies to make their
spyware easy to control or remove. Thus, like the Wiretap Act and the
SCA, these solutions cannot effectively combat spyware because they do
not allow consumers to have a meaningful say in what software can be
legally installed on their computers and, hence, cannot prevent the damage
caused by spyware.
2. DAMAGE THRESHOLDS
[22] Furthermore, the damage thresholds of the CFAA and the trespass to
chattels claims also render these solutions ineffective to combat spyware.
These damage requirements allow courts to decide how undesirable or
harmful a given piece of software is, rather than letting consumers decide
for themselves what software can legally be installed on their computers.
[23] As mentioned previously, if an individual wanted to bring an action
against a spyware company under the CFAA, they would most likely have
to prove a loss of $5,000 in a year.53 Courts differ widely in their
interpretation of the $5,000 damage requirement. Some courts have held
that claims may be aggregated among multiple plaintiffs to fulfill the
$5,000 loss in one year requirement,54 while others require that the $5,000
loss must be inflicted on a single computer.55 For example, in In re
DoubleClick, the court held that because DoubleClick’s collection of data
through cookies had not caused $5,000 in damage to a single computer,
the CFAA did not apply.56 The court found that the damages could only
be aggregated “over victims and time for a single act.”57 By contrast, in In
re Toys R Us, Inc., the court found that the placement of cookies on
consumers’ computers could constitute a single act and that damages
could be aggregated across the class.58
53

18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(b)(i) (2000).
See, e.g., In re DoubleClick Inc., 154 Supp. 2d at 524.
55
See, e.g., In re Am. Online, Inc. Version 5.0 Software Litig., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359,
1374 (S.D. Fla. 2001); In re Toys R Us, Inc. Privacy Litig., No. 00-CV-2746, 2001 WL
34517252 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
56
154 F. Supp. 2d at 524.
57
Id.
58
Toys R Us, 2001 WL 34517252, at *11.
54
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[24] There is a similar damage threshold implied in the common law claim
of trespass to chattels. If a court finds that damage caused by trespass is
not serious enough, a consumer attempting to use this common law claim
to punish a violation is out of luck. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com,
Inc. provides one example of a trespass to chattels claim in the ecommerce realm failing because a court did not find that enough damage
had been caused.59 In Ticketmaster, Tickets.com, a direct competitor to
Ticketmaster, provided event information to the public via its website.60
Tickets.com used spiders to search and copy information from
Ticketmaster’s site, and then provided unauthorized deep links to
Ticketmaster’s site, allowing visitors to access information on its site and
bypass its main page and associated advertising.61 Ticketmaster brought
suit alleging, among other things, trespass to chattels from Tickets.com.62
In evaluating the trespass claim, the Ticketmaster court denied the
injunction because of insufficient proof of trespass and irreparable
injury.63 The court stated:
A basic element of trespass to chattels must be physical
harm to the chattel (not present here) or some obstruction
of its basic function (in the court's opinion not sufficiently
shown here). TM has presented statistics showing an
estimate of the number of hits by T.Com spiders in its own
computers and has presented rough comparisons with the
total use of the computers by all users of the computers.
The comparative use by T.Com appears very small and
there is no showing that the use interferes to any extent
with the regular business of TM.64

59

Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522 (C.D. Cal.
2000).
60
Id. at *1.
61
Id. at *2.
62
Id. at *3.
63
Id. at *4.
64
Id.
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IV. KEY ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL SPYWARE LEGISLATION: NOTICE,
CONSENT, REMOVAL REQUIREMENTS
A. THE INADEQUACIES OF CURRENT LEGISLATION
[25] As detailed above, if one surveys current legislation, it becomes
apparent that the major weakness in the existing body of law is that
software purveyors are not required to give consumers meaningful notice
and consent before installing potentially damaging software. Current laws
make it too easy for a consumer to “consent” to spyware without ever
realizing that spyware is being loaded onto the consumer’s computer.
B. THE NATURE OF SPYWARE
[26] The nature of spyware bolsters the proposition that meaningful notice
and consent requirements are the key to effective legislation.
1. “SPYWARE” IS HARD TO DEFINE
[27] “Spyware” means different things to different people. What one
person views as harmful software another person may view as helpful.
Although many extreme types of spyware may be universally viewed as
“bad software” in the eyes of the computer user (i.e. software that secretly
installs itself onto a computer to steal personal information to be used for
identity theft), other types of software may be viewed as desirable by
some individuals and not desirable by others. For example, SideStep is a
program that informs a user who has purchased a plane ticket whether
better deals on the same trip are available with other airlines. However,
potentially useful programs such as SideStep track what users see and
what users' preferences are. These programs also have extensive
information about users' offline activities.65 While some users might view
this as intrusive software and wish to prevent it from installing itself onto
their computers, others would welcome its installation. Thus, spyware
legislation that is anchored in notice and consent requirements will allow
users to define for themselves what constitutes unwelcome spyware.

65

See Megan Johnston, Struggling Upstream, FORBES, November 14, 2005, at 100.
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2. CHANGING TECHNOLOGY
[28] Spyware technology is constantly advancing, causing legislation that
is too specific (e.g. “bad acts” legislation) to become quickly outdated.
Therefore, more flexible legislation is necessary. As one commentator has
noted, “The fact is that laws for controlling inappropriate and unethical
uses of technology are always framed after the problem has mutated into
wildly different forms and the issues are rarely understood by the
lawmakers who sign them off anyway.”66 Decisions about what kinds of
software should be installed on consumers’ computers should not be left in
the hands of legislators. Notice and consent requirements would force
software purveyors to explain which functions each new piece of software
performs and allow users to make case-by-case decisions on which types
of novel software to allow onto their computers as technology progresses.
In addition, flexible legislation rooted in consumer consent would also
avoid stifling innovation.
V. DOES PENDING SPYWARE LEGISLATION FIT THE BILL?
[29] The best way to combat spyware is to anchor spyware legislation in
meaningful user notice and consent. This section explores currently
pending spyware legislation and, more specifically, the notice and consent
provisions included in the legislation.
A. I-SPY AND SPY ACT
[30] The Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act ("SPY
ACT"), which was introduced by Representative Mary Bono during the
109th Congress and passed in the House on May 23, 2005, is a complex
and comprehensive proposal to fight spyware. The SPY ACT outlaws
many of the functions currently performed by spyware, for example
“delivering advertisements that a user of the computer cannot close . . . ”67
and “modifying . . . security or other settings of the computer that protect
information about the owner or authorized user for the purposes of causing

66

Mark Gibbs , Banning the Licking of Toads, NETWORK WORLD, Oct. 11, 2004, at 62.
Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass (SPY) Act, H.R. 29, 109th Cong. at
2(a)(1)(E) (2005).
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damage or harm to the computer or owner or user.”68 In this regard, it is
similar to the state “bad acts” bills.
[31] The Internet Spyware Prevention Act of 2005 (I-SPY) is the criminal
component of the SPY ACT/I-SPY package. In contrast to the regulatory
framework of the SPY ACT, I-SPY combats spyware by imposing
penalties for actual harm to computers.69 I-SPY focuses on protecting
personal information and safeguarding consumers from spyware that
attacks security protection that is already in place on computers.70 Under
I-SPY, anyone who uses spyware to intentionally break into a computer
and either alter the computer's security settings, obtain personal
information with the intent to defraud or injure a person, or with the intent
to damage a computer, faces up to a two-year prison sentence. Those who
use software to intentionally break into a computer and then uses that
software in furtherance of another federal crime face the same penalty.71
[32] Although I-SPY focuses on penalties after the fact and does not
contain notice and consent provisions, the SPY ACT includes a notice
requirement for software downloads containing spyware that collects
information.72 The notice provisions in the SPY ACT require “clear and
68

Id. § 2(a)(2)(D).
Crawford, supra note 6, at 1448.
70
Internet Spyware Prevention (I-SPY) Act, H.R. 744, 109th Cong. at 2 (2005).
71
Id. § 1030A
72
SPY ACT, H.R. 29, at 3:
SEC. 3. PROHIBITION OF COLLECTION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION
WITHOUT NOTICE AND CONSENT.
(a) Opt-in Requirement. Except as provided in subsection (e), it is
unlawful for any person—
(1) to transmit to a protected computer, which is not owned by such
person and for which such person is not an authorized user, any
information collection program, unless-(A) such information collection program provides notice in
accordance with subsection (c) before execution of any of the
information collection functions of the program; and
(B) such information collection program includes the
functions required under subsection (d); or
(2) to execute any information collection program installed on such a
protected computer unless-(A) before execution of any of the information collection functions of
the program, the owner or an authorized user of the protected computer
69
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conspicuous notice in plain language,” that notice be clearly distinguished
from any other information presented at the same time on the computer,
and that notice contain particular required texts in English, with three
possibilities depending on the type of software:
(1) [T]his program will collect and transmit information
about you. Do you accept?
(2) [T]his program will collect information about Web
pages you access and will use that information to display
advertising on your computer. Do you accept?
(3) [T]his program will collect and transmit information
about you and will collect information about Web pages
you access and use that to display advertising on your
computer. Do you accept? 73
In addition, before accepting the consumer must be able to see exactly
what type of information is being collected and the purpose for which such
information is to be collected and sent.74
[33] Information collecting programs must also be fitted with a disabling
function that “is easily identifiable to a user of the computer” and “can be
performed without undue effort or knowledge by the user of the protected
computer.”75 With regard to the removal requirements, the SPY ACT
provides that programs must be easily removable by the consumer, and a
clear delineation between which "pop-up" advertising is caused by which
spyware program so that consumers can easily remove unwanted pop-up
generating software.76

has consented to such execution pursuant to notice in accordance with
subsection (c) . . . .
73
Id. § 3(c)(1)(B)(i)-(iii).
74
Id. § 3(c)(1)(D).
75
Id. § 43(a)(1)(A)-(B).
76
Id. § 3(d)(1).
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B. SPY BLOCK
[34] The Senate is considering the Software Principles Yielding Better
Levels of Consumer Knowledge Act (“SPY BLOCK” Act).77 The SPY
BLOCK Act is in part a “bad acts” bill, but also contains many notice and
consent provisions. Under SPY BLOCK, it is unlawful for “any person
who is not the user of a protected computer to install computer software
on that computer, or to authorize, permit, or cause the installation of
computer software on that computer,” unless notice is provided. Notice
must:
(1) include a clear notification, displayed on the screen
until the user either grants or denies consent to installation,
of the name and general nature of the computer software
that will be installed if the user grants consent; and
(2) include a separate disclosure, with respect to each
information collection, advertising, distributed computing,
and settings modification feature contained in the computer
software, that
(A) remains displayed on the screen until the user
either grants or denies consent to that feature.78
[35] Furthermore, depending on the software’s functions, different types
of notice must be provided before installation. If the software contains an
information collection feature, then notice must describe: (1) the type of
personal or network information to be collected and transmitted by the
computer software; and (2) the purpose for which the personal or network
information is to be collected, transmitted, and used.79 If the software
contains pop-up ad features, then notice must provide:
(i) a representative example of the type of advertisement
that may be delivered by the computer software;

77

Supra note 5.
Id. § 3(a).
79
Id. § 3(a)(2)(B).
78
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(ii) a clear description of—
(I) the estimated frequency with which each type of
advertisement may be delivered; or
(II) the factors on which the frequency will depend;
and
(iii) a clear description of how the user can distinguish each
type of advertisement that the computer software delivers
from advertisements generated by other software, Internet
website operators, or service.80
If the software contains a distributed computing feature,81 then notice must
describe:
(i) the types of information or messages the computer
software will cause the computer to transmit;
(ii) (I) the estimated frequency with which the computer
software will cause the computer to transmit such messages
or information; or (II) the factors on which the frequency
will depend;
(iii) the estimated volume of such information or messages,
and the likely impact, if any, on the processing or
communications capacity of the user's computer; and
(iv) the nature, volume, and likely impact on the
computer's processing capacity of any computational or
processing tasks the computer software will cause the
computer to perform in order to generate the information or
80

Id. § 3(a)(2)(C).
The term "distributed computing feature" means a function of computer software that,
when installed on a computer, transmits information or messages, other than personal or
network information about the user of the computer, to any other computer without the
knowledge or direction of the user and for purposes unrelated to the tasks or functions the
user intentionally performs using the computer. Id. § 8(7).

81
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messages the computer software will cause the computer to
transmit.82
[36] If the software contains a settings modification feature, then notice
must provide “a clear description of the nature of the modification, its
function, and any collateral effects the modification may produce.”83 In
addition, like the SPY ACT, under SPY BLOCK software must offer an
uninstall function, and software purveyors must provide “a clear
description of procedures the user may follow to turn off such feature or
uninstall the computer software.”84
VI. SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS
[37] The SPY ACT/I-SPY and SPY BLOCK Acts could prove to be very
effective in the fight against spyware. Many provisions address the major
shortfalls of current state laws being used to battle spyware. Most notably,
the acts focus on the importance of providing computer users with notice
and requiring that software purveyors obtain meaningful consent. Unlike
the Wiretap Act and the SCA, the proposed legislation requires clear and
conspicuous notice provisions, which ensure that computer users cannot
accidentally click away their rights when notice of a piece of spyware’s
capabilities are buried within the terms of the license agreement. In
addition, unlike the Wiretap Act and the SCA, potential defendants cannot
hide behind a third party’s alleged consent in order to escape liability for
installing potentially harmful software. Because the proposed acts focus
on clear and conspicuous notice and consent provisions they can also
prevent damage before it happens, unlike the after-the-fact solutions
provided by the CFAA and trespass to chattels claims. Furthermore,
consent can, in effect, be revoked under these proposed acts because they
require that software be fitted with removal capabilities.
[38] There are, however, a few major weaknesses in the notice and
consent provisions of the proposed acts. The next section suggests how
these acts can be tweaked to remedy their shortcomings.
82

Id. § 3(a)(2)(D).
SPY BLOCK, supra note 5 at § 3(a)(2)(E).
84
Id. § 3(a)(2)(F).
83
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A. RIGID DEFINITIONS
[39] The notice provisions in both the SPY ACT and SPY BLOCK are
written to apply to very specific types of technology. Very specific
wording does make what is required of software purveyors clear, but (1)
these provisions may allow certain types of software that a consumer may
find undesirable to slip through the cracks; and (2), these provisions can
become quickly outdated as technology progresses.
[40] The main problem with the notice and consent provisions found in the
SPY ACT is that these provisions only apply to software programs falling
under the Act’s definition of “information collection program.”85 Thus,
other software that consumers may find undesirable can still be installed
without any notice or consent. For example, some political data-mining
companies collect and share aggregated, non-personally identifiable
information with campaigns.86 Many of these companies build their
political databases by providing free e-mail services and requiring
subscribers to fill out questionnaires.87 Initial questionnaires collect the
demographics of database members, such as age, gender, income,
85

Id. § 3(b)(1):
(b) Information Collection Program.
(1) In general. For purposes of this section, the term "information
collection program" means computer software that performs either of
the following functions:
(A) Collection of personally identifiable information. The
computer software-(i) collects personally identifiable information; and
(ii)(I) sends such information to a person other than
the owner or authorized user of the computer, or (II)
uses such information to deliver advertising to, or
display advertising on, the computer.
(B) Collection of information regarding web pages visited to
deliver advertising. The computer software-(i) collects information regarding the Web pages
accessed using the computer; and
(ii) uses such information to deliver advertising to, or
display advertising on, the computer.

86

See Philip N. Howard, Deep Democracy, Thin Citizenship: The Impact of Digital
Media in Political Campaign Strategy, 597 ANNALS 153, 164-165 (2005).
87
Id. § 165.
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expected major purchases, hobbies, interests, family size, and education.88
Because these companies may only collect and share aggregated
information, as opposed to personally identifiable information, their
software would be immune from the notice and consent provisions of the
SPY ACT. Consumers who may not want this software on their computer,
because it could slow down their computer or because they do not want
their data to be collected even not personally identifiable, would not have
proper notice of the software’s functions. In addition, because the
definition of “information collection program” is so specific, software
developers could create spyware that falls outside the definition in order to
avoid these notice and consent requirements.
[41] Similarly, SPY BLOCK’s notice provisions, which call for specific
types of notice depending on whether software has information collection
features, pop-up ad features, distributed computing features, or settings
modification features, can quickly become outdated as technology outside
these four functionality categories is developed.
B. UNDEFINED CONSENT
[42] Furthermore, neither the SPY ACT nor SPY BLOCK contains a clear
description of what constitutes consent. The SPY ACT does not define
what qualifies as consent, and SPY BLOCK merely states:
(b) Consent. For purposes of section 2(a)(2), consent
requires—
(1) consent by the user of the computer to the
installation of the computer software; and
(2) separate affirmative consent by the user of the
computer to each information collection feature,
advertising feature, distributed computing feature,
and settings modification feature contained in the
computer software.89

88
89

Id.
SPY BLOCK, supra note 5, at §3(b).
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“Consent” is therefore left open to interpretation. Has a person who
clicked an “I agree” button after reading notice which was conspicuous
but written in a confusing or misleading manner consented? Under the
acts, the answer could possibly be ‘yes.’
C. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
[43] Unlike the SPY ACT, ideal spyware legislation would contain notice
and consent provisions which apply to all software that will potentially be
installed onto a computer,90 not just software that falls under a specific
90

See SPY ACT, supra note 3, at 3(b)(2) (exceptions outlined in the SPY ACT and SPY
BLOCK should still be honored in order to avoid overwhelming the computer user with
unnecessary warnings:
(2) Exception for software collecting information regarding
web pages visited within a particular Web site. Computer software that
otherwise would be considered an information collection program by
reason of paragraph (1)(B) shall not be considered such a program if-(A) the only information collected by the software regarding Web pages
that are accessed using the computer is information regarding Web pages
within a particular Web site;
(B) such information collected is not sent to a person other than-(i) the provider of the Web site accessed; or
(ii) a party authorized to facilitate the display or functionality of
Web pages within the Web site accessed; and
(C) the only advertising delivered to or displayed on the computer using
such information is advertising on Web pages within that particular Web
site.
See also SPY ACT, supra note 3, at 5(b):
(b) Exception Relating to Security. Nothing in this Act shall apply to-(1) any monitoring of, or interaction with, a subscriber's
Internet or other network connection or service, or a protected
computer, by a telecommunications carrier, cable operator, computer
hardware or software provider, or provider of information service or
interactive computer service, to the extent that such monitoring or
interaction is for network or computer security purposes, diagnostics,
technical support, or repair, or for the detection or prevention of
fraudulent activities; or
(2) a discrete interaction with a protected computer by a
provider of computer software solely to determine whether the user of
the computer is authorized to use such software . . . .
See also SPY BLOCK, supra note 5, at 5:
SEC. 5. EXCEPTIONS.
(a) Preinstalled Software…
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definition which may become outdated. In addition, rather than providing
specific notice requirements for discrete categories of spyware as SPY
BLOCK does, ideal national spyware legislation would provide detailed
yet flexible notice requirements applicable to all types of software, even as
technology progresses.
[44] For example, in order to ensure notice is adequately conveyed to a
consumer, legislation could include a list of factors that must be met in
order for notice to be considered “clear and conspicuous.” The FTC has
defined “clear and conspicuous” in its business guide for online
advertising, "Dot Com Disclosures: Information About Online
Advertising.”91 The factors detailed in this guide could be borrowed and
integrated into the spyware legislation. This would cause spyware
purveyors to pay particular attention to: (1) the placement of the required
disclosure and its proximity to the “I agree” button or other consent
method; (2) the prominence of the required disclosure; (3) the presence of
distracting features; (4) the need for the repetition of the required
disclosure due to the length of the notice; (5) the adequacy of volume,
cadence and duration of any audio disclosure; and (6) the
understandability of the language of the disclosure.92 These factors could
rein in courts which, as detailed above in Part III, appear to vary widely in
their understanding of “clear and conspicuous” in the e-commerce realm.

(b) Other Exceptions. Sections 3(a)(2), 3(b)(2), and 4 do not apply to
any feature of computer software that is reasonably needed to –
(1) provide capability for general purpose online browsing,
electronic mail, or instant messaging, or for any optional function
that is directly related to such capability and that the user
knowingly chooses to use;
(2) determine whether or not the user of the computer is
licensed or authorized to use the computer software; and
(3) provide technical support for the use of the computer
software by the user of the computer.
(c) Passive Transmission, Hosting, or Link . . .
(d) Software Resident in Temporary Memory . . .
(e) Features Activated by User Options…
91
BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, FED. TRADE COMM’N, DOT.COM DISCLOSURES:
INFORMATION ABOUT ONLINE ADVERTISING, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/dotcom/index.html.
92
See id. at 5-6.
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[45] In order to define the flexible parameters for notice, spyware
legislators could also borrow from other fields. In the realm of legal
ethics, Model Rule 1.0(e) defines "informed consent" as "the agreement by
a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has
communicated adequate information and explanation about the material
risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of
conduct."93 The Restatement (Second) of Agency 376 defines consent as
"[t]he existence and extent of the duties of the agent to the principal are
determined by the terms of the agreement between the parties, interpreted
in light of the circumstances under which it is made, except to the extent
that fraud, duress, illegality, or the incapacity of one or both of the parties
to the agreement modifies it or deprives it of legal effect."94 In the torts
realm, for medical negligence to constitute malpractice a successful suit
will depend on the plaintiff's ability to demonstrate five key elements: (1)
the physician's duty owed to the patient to provide information; (2) breach
of the physician's duty; (3) harm suffered by the patient; (4) the relation of
the harm to the development of an undisclosed risk; and (5) evidence that
had the patient been informed of the risk, he or she would not have
consented to the procedure.95
[46] Borrowing from these elements, national legislation could require
notice to include: (1) adequate information about what functions the
software performs; and (2) material risks of the software, e.g., will it share
personal information or change or disable the functionality of a user's
machine as set by the user. Deceit should violate consent. In addition, in
examining informed consent courts could consider the harm suffered by
the user, and the relation of that harm to the development of an
undisclosed risk.
[47] Further, if there is a question as to whether it is reasonable to expect a
consumer has read and understood the terms of an agreement, survey
evidence could be utilized. With respect to advertising, the FTC’s Policy
Statement on Deception states that an advertisement is deceptive where
there is “a misrepresentation, omission or other practice that misleads the
93

Model Rules of Conduct 1.0(e).
Restatement of (Second) Agency 376.
95
RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 23-49 (1986).
94
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consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s
detriment.”96 In order to determine what a “consumer acting reasonably in
the circumstances” would do, the FTC has increasingly used consumer
surveys and such objective evidence as proof of the likeliness to mislead
in advertising.97 In addition, courts frequently adopt surveys to determine
consumers’ perceptions in trademark infringement cases brought under the
Lanham act.98 In order to ensure software purveyors obtain meaningful
user consent before installing software onto a computer, legislation could
require that if there is a question as to whether a reasonable consumer
would be able to read and understand notice provisions, both plaintiff and
defendant may present survey evidence.
VII.

CONCLUSION

[48] National spyware legislation is necessary because the only current
legislation specifically addressing the problem exists on a state level.
State spyware legislation, which varies from state to state, leads to
significant business planning and litigation costs.99 In addition, the ability
of one state to set policy for the whole country via state spyware
legislation triggers Dormant Commerce Clause issues.100 Because of these
factors, spyware must be combated at the national level.
[49] While spyware can be challenged under laws which were not
specifically enacted to address the spyware problem, namely the Wiretap
Act, the Stored Communications Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
and the common law claim of trespass to chattels, these laws are
inadequate to combat the problem because they do not allow consumers to
have a meaningful say in what software can be legally installed on their

96

FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION, available at http://www3.ftc.gov/bcp/
policystmt/ad-decept.htm (1983).
97
See, e.g., Kraft, Inc. v. F.T.C., 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 909
(1993); In re Thompson Medical Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984); Stouffer Foods Corp.,
5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,686 (1994).
98
Peter H. Huang, Moody Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Materiality
of Information and the Reasonableness of Investors, 13 S. CT. ECON. REV. 99, 114
(2005).
99
Menell, supra note 21, at 1412.
100
Crawford, supra note 6, at 1443.

25

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue1

computers. The Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act have
“consent exceptions” which can be so liberally construed by courts that
consumers can unwittingly “consent” to the installation of spyware. The
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and the common law claim of trespass to
chattels, are problematic because they are after-the-fact solutions that
cannot prevent problems to begin with.
[50] National spyware legislation currently being proposed, i.e. the SPY
ACT, I-SPY and SPY BLOCK, could be very effective in battling the
spyware problem. These bills contain detailed notice and consent
provisions, and thus can avoid the problems posed in vague and loosely
enforced consent provisions of the Wiretap Act and the SCA, and the
nonexistent notice and consent provisions in the CFAA and the common
law claim of trespass to chattels. This legislation, grounded in notice and
consent requirements, would provide for the flexibility needed to battle
ever-changing spyware technology.
[51] Although the proposed legislation is very promising, there are still a
few areas that could be improved. First, the notice and consent provisions
of the SPY ACT and SPY BLOCK are written to apply to very specific
types of technology, and thus some software that certain users may
consider harmful would not be subject to these provisions. Second, the
limited application would prevent legislation from battling new forms of
potentially harmful spyware. Third, neither SPY ACT nor SPY BLOCK
contain a clear description of what constitutes consent. Because “consent”
is left open to interpretation, even if computer users are given notice that is
written in a confusing or misleading manner, courts may interpret consent
to this type of notice to be “informed.”
[52] In order to improve the currently proposed legislation, legislators
could look to the FTC’s “clear and conspicuous” guidelines for internet
advertising to shape spyware legislation’s notice requirements.
Legislators could borrow elements of informed consent from other fields,
and require that notice include adequate information about (1) what
functions the software performs, and (2) material risks of the software. In
examining informed consent, courts could look at the harms suffered by
the user and the relation of the harm to the development of an undisclosed
risk. Lastly, if there is a question about whether it is reasonable to expect
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that a consumer has read and understood the terms of an agreement,
survey evidence could be utilized.

27

